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NOTE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTROLS FOR AUDITORS: THE NEED FOR A
CONSISTENT STANDARD
Civil liability has become an accepted method of forcing compliance
with the federal securities laws.' Recent court decisions have made
accountants keenly aware that their auditing functions expose them to
civil liability for misstatements and negligence.' The accountant,
however, has been less aware of the other sanctions that may be
imposed on him for failure to properly execute his auditing functions.3
I. Private civil actions have been implied under seven sections of the Securities Exchange Act.
See J.1 Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) [§ 14(a)]; Fishman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) [§ 10-b]; Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944) [§ 6(b)]; Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) [§ 15(c)]; Hawkins
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949) [§§ I I(d)(2), 17(a)];
Remar v Clayton Sec. Corp.. 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949 [Regulation T]. See also Buttrey
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 410 F.2d 135 (7th. Cir. 1969); [violation of N.Y.S.E.
Regulations]; Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd per
curianr. - F 2d - (2d Cir. 1969) [Regulation U].
2. See Note, 4ccountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial Statements, 67
COLUf L Rpv 1437 (1967), cf Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). Globus v Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
3. Only five cases have been found in which federal criminal charges have been brought against
auditors, all of whom were certified public accountants. In United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831
(S.D.N Y June, 1968), appeal docketed. No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968), two partners and a senior
associate of the international accounting firm of Lybrand, Ross Brothers & Montgomery were
convicted of conspiracy and mail fraud in connection with their audit and certification of the 1962
financial statement of Continental Vending Machine Company. See Wall St. Journal, June 24,
1968, at 7, col I. Accountants were also convicted in United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854
(2d Cir.). cert denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964) and United States v. White, 124 F.2d 181 (2d Cir.
1941). The disposition of United States v. Olen, 183 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (motion for
change of venue granted), is not known, although one of the defendants subsequently submitted his
permanent resignation from further practice before the SEC. In re Kerlin, S.E.C. Acct. Series
Rd. No 105, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. I 72,127 (1966); In United States v. Getchell, 282 F.2d
611 (5th Cir. 1960), the defendant was acquitted on appeal.
The earliest criminal prosecution of an auditor which has been found occurred in England in
1931. See W RICH, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (1935)
[Hereinafter cited as RICH]. In Rex v. Kylsant & Morland, reported in RICH, at 100-09,
Moreland, the auditor, was charged under section 84 of the Larceny Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict.,
c. 96. with certifying false financial statements for two years in order to permit the chairman of
his client to sell a large issue of its debentures at a grossly inflated price. The chairman, Lord
Kylsant, had previously prepared the statements for inclusion in a prospectus. It was specifically
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These other possible sanctions are the subject matter of this note.
Criminal liability is discussed first. Disqualification from practice
before the Securities Exchange Commission, the most serious federal
administrative sanction, is considered in Part II.
I. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Initially, it should be noted that there are many statutes under
which criminal liability may be imposed on accountants.4 Six statutes,
however, hold particular significance for those involved in making up
financial statements sent through the mails or filed with the
government. They are: the false statement,5 mail fraud,' aiding and
abetting,7 and conspiracys statutes, and the criminal provisions of the
Securities Act' and the Exchange Act.'"
charged that Kylsant had lumped into the current profits account substantial secret revenues
accumulated in prior years and profits from extraordinary sales of major corporate assets,
creating the appearance of substantial earnings when in fact the company had been operating
unprofitably. Kylsant was convicted and the verdict was affirmed on appeal. Rex. v. Kylsant,
(1932) I K.B. 442. Three accountants testified on Moreland's behalf that they would have certified
the statements in the same form as he. RICH, at 108. The court clearly distinguished between his
civil and criminal responsibilities and noted that Moreland had no motive for the crime. It stated
that in certifying the statements Moreland had indicated his own satisfaction with their substantial
accuracy and that:
[I]f he was right in that . . . there [should be] an end of the case against him, and he
[should be found] not guilty. If on the other hand he was wrong in this sense, [civil liability
ought not be imposed upon him for his breach of duty to the company]. . . . But...
we are not concerned here with any question of civil liability or breach of duty. What you
have to determine is whether, assuming that Lord Kylsant was guilty . . . . there was any
deliberate and conscious act on the part of Mr. Moreland in carrying out that design by
putting his hand to a certificate which he knew was not justified by the facts and he knew
did not correspond with his duty.
RIcH, at 107. Moreland was acquitted. RIch, at 108.
4. E.g.. in tax practice the accountant subjects himself to perjury prosecution, INT. Ri v, Cool
oF 1954, § 7206(l), by wilfully preparing a false tax return,Levin v. United States, 5 F.2d 598
(9th Cir.), cert. denied. 269 U.S. 562 (1925), and to tax evasion prosecution, INT. RLv. Cool ol.
1954, § 7206(2), by wilfully assisting others to evade their taxes, United States v. Borgis, 182
F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1950). See United States v. Edwards, 230 F. Supp. 881 (D.C. Ore. 1964), revid
in part on other grounds. 375 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1967).
5. IS U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
9, Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964) [Hereinafter cited as Securities Act].
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1964) [Hereinafter cited as
Exchange Act].
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A. The Mens Rea Problem
Before beginning an analysis of the individual statutes, one
common problem should be noted. All of the statutes require miens rea
on the part of the defendant. The false statement statute and the
criminal provisions of both the Securities Act and Exchange Act
require "'wilful" violation. Part (b) of the aiding and abetting statute
applies to those who "wilfully" cause an act to be done which violates
a federal statute. The mail fraud statute requires that the defendant
have an 'intent to defraud." The conspiracy statute has been judicially
interpreted as requiring an "intent to injure or defraud."
Classically, 'wilfulness" demands that the prohibited act be done
consciously or intentionally as opposed to accidentally."' This
definition, in large measure, has been sustained by commentators who
define the "wilful" requirement in terms of advertence to surrounding
circumstances and consequences.' This means that if the statute
requires wilful activity, the defendant must advert to the elements
which make his activity a crime. 13 Since this demands that the
defendant be "conscious" of his actions, the commentators have
suggested that the accused must act either recklessly or knowingly. 4
Negligence, by definition, assumes inadvertence. 5 Under this classic
approach, then, one can be convicted for intentional or reckless actions,
but not for negligent violations.
Legislatures are notoriously sloppy in their drafting of criminal
statutes." Though "wilfulness" is generally added to a statute to
indicate some form of mens rea is necessary, the legislatures seldom
define exactly to what elements of the crime the requirement applies.
II S,,, t. United States, v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 242-43 (1937); United States
v Murdock, 290 U S 389, 393-94 (1933). United States v. Rabinowitz, 327 F.2d 62, 77-80 (6th
Cir 64). Garrett % Commonealth, 215 Ky. 484,487, 285 S.W. 203, 204 (1926).
12 G WILIIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw, THE GENERAL PART 34, 35 (2d ed. 1961) (Hereinafter cited as
Wit ii \ \is]. Remington & Helstad, The IMenral Element in Crime-A Legislative Problem. 1952
WIs L Ri \ 644, 663 [Hereinafter cited as Remington].
13 Viii i ' s, at 34
14 \ ii i is \\ at 31, Remington at 658.
15 ,lliams sa s that.
Outside the class of crimes requiring mens rea there are some that do not require any
particular state of mind but do require negligence. Negligence in law is not necessarily a
state ol mind, and thus these crimes are best regarded as not requiring mens rea. However,
negligence is a kind of legal fault, and in that respect they are akin to crimes requiring
W6 I ing\is at 64
16 Remington at 644.
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For example, if a statute prohibits the wilful filing of false statements,
one can legitimately ask whether the "wilful" applies only to the filing
or if one is required to advert to the falsity of the statement. 7
The courts, then, have been forced to interpret the meaning of
wilfulness according to the purpose of the individual statute."8 As
courts differ over the purpose of a statute, they appear to differ over
the requirement of wilfulness.' 9 For the accountant, the problems
created by this ad hoc determination of the courts are compounded by
the nature of their profession.
The accountant is most vulnerable to federal prosecution when he is
fulfilling his auditing functions. These activities are governed within the
profession by standards promulgated by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, and ultimately by the standards
embodied in the regulatory laws themselves. Good faith compliance
with these standards should insulate an accountant from criminal
liability for he cannot act recklessly or intentionally and still act in good
faith."0 But since it is a state of mind, good faith can only be proven
inferentially.2' Professional men who conform to the standards of their
profession are presumed to act in good faith.2 2 The auditor who
17. Thus, the Model Penal Code specifies which elements of a crime the specified nens rea
will apply to. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02 (1962).
18. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1933).
19. For example, the circuits are in conflict over the ability of the government to secure
conviction for "wilful" failure to file a tax return if the defendant's actions were in careless
disregard to his duty. Compare Abdul v. United States, 254 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1969); Yarborough
v. United States, 230 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1956), with United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240 (3d
Cir. 1966); Haner v. United States, 315 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1963). See also the discussion in United
States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964) considering the degree of scienter a defendant
must have to be held wilfully to have violated the Securities Act.
20. E.g.. Beck v. United States, 305 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890
(1962); Harris v. United States, 261 F.2d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied. 360 U.S. 933
(1959); Gold v. United States, 36 F.2d 16, 32 (8th Cir. 1929). See generally Durland v. United
States, -161 U.S. 306, 314 (1968); United States v. Baren, 305 F.2d 527, 533 (2d Cir. 1962).
For a case in which good faith was an unsuccessful defense to the charge of conspiracy, see
Walters v. United States, 256 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 833 (1958).
21. Walters v. United States, 256 F.2d 840, 841 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 833 (1958);
United States v. Brandt, 196 F.2d 653, 657 (2d Cir. 1952); Deaver v. United States, 155 F.2d
740, 744-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 329 U.S. 766 (1946); Marshall v. United States, 146 F.2d
620 (9th Cir. 1944).
22. Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied. 343 U.S. 980 (1952); see
Hayward v. Echols, 362 F.2d 791, 796-97 (5th Cir. 1966); Nardini v. Gilbert, 260 F.2d 177 (4th
Cir. 1958); Spangler v. Sellers, 5 F. 882. 887 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst,
245 Minn. 249, 253, 72 N.W.2d 364, 367 (1955); Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 209, 49 N.E.
760, 762 (1898). See also Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES. THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.3 (1956); VII J.
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satisfies generally accepted auditing standards in the performance of his
examination and the expression of his opinion,23 and the accountant
who conforms to generally accepted accounting principles, act in good
faith and should incur no criminal liability.24
But in a field as quickly changing as securities law, and since an
accountant's task is highly dependent on the demands of his client,
these standards cannot be expected to govern explicitly every knotty or
unique problem. It is in this gray area that the courts have the most
difficulty."5 They must distinguish between a good *faith effort to
comply with accounting standards and a "wilful" violation of the
statutes. Since both the accounting standards and the definition of
-wilful" are vague, there is a danger that "wilful" may be expanded
to include what would otherwise be considered negligent activities.2"
WIUMORE. THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 2090 (3d ed. 1940); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical
Pracitionerv. 12 VAND. L REv. 549,614 (1959).
When there is no definitive standard of conduct or action concerning a question, the
professional man need only exercise his honest judgment. St. George v. State, 283 App. Div. 245,
251, 127 N.Y.S.2d 147, 150 ajfd, 308 N.Y. 681, 124 N.E.2d 320 (1954); Kinsley v. Curravetta,
244 App Div. 213, 219, 279 N.Y.S. 29, 32-33 (1935), affd, 273 N.Y. 559, 7 N.E.2d 691 (1937);
People v Kressel, 243 App. Div. 137, 149, 277 N.Y.S. 168, 175 (1935); Hodges v. Carter, 239
N.C. 517, 521.80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1954); Collins v. Wanner, 382 P.2d 105, 109 (Okla. 1963).
23. Pre-Trial Memorandum for Defendants, United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831 (S.D.N.Y.
June, 1968) appeal docketed. No, 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968). It has been stated recently that
"accountants should not be held to a standard higher than that recognized in their profession."
Escott '. BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see Gamel v. Ernst &
Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 253, 72 N.W.2d 364, 367 (1955).
24. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); cf. Hayward
v. Echols, 362 F 2d 791, 796-97 (5th Cir. 1966); Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 980 (1952); Spangler v. Sellers, 5 F. 882. 887 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881); Gamel
v. Ernst & Ernst. 245 Minn. 249, 253. 72 N.W.2d 364, 367 (1955); Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y.
201, 209. 49 N.E 760, 762 (1898). It is possible, of course, that the auditor or accountant may
comply with the letter of the standards applicable to him, while knowing that his compliance will
foster deceit If this is the case the defense of good faith is unavailable, but the accountant or
auditor would have acted with specific intent to violate the law.
25. Remington recognizes this as a general problem in statutes requiring mens rea. He points
out that
Apart from a few jurisdictions, it is generally agreed that something more than ordinary
negligence is required as a basis for criminal liability. Having rejected the familiar, if not
easy, standard of ordinary negligence, the courts faced the problem of whether to withdraw
to the next clear benchmark and require recklessness which, as here used, means a
subjective realization of the dangerousness of the conduct. The failure. for the most part,
to do so leaves the task of formulating a standard which is neither entirely a subjective
test nor the objective test of ordinary care. Conceptually this is as difficult as any problem
in the criminal law,
Remington, 658
26. See United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625, 628-31 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 370 U.S. 917
(1%2); Stone v United States, 113 F.2d 70. 75 (6th Cir. 1940).
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The problem is most evident in the mistake of fact situation. If
"wilfulness" is defined in terms of intentional violation, and
intentional is given its traditional meaning, then mistake of fact should
be a defense to prosecution.27 Such an analysis, however, may not be
in accord with the desires of the courts to use the criminal penalty
provisions to foster compliance with the provisions of the Securities
Acts. Thus, despite the requirement of wilfulness, the courts create a
criminal sanction for lack of "due care. 28
The way the courts have resolved, or failed to resolve, the mens rea
problem will be discussed in the context of each of the statutes.
B. False Statements or Entries
1. Actus Rea
Section 1001, the false statements statute, prohibits the knowing and
wilful falsifying, concealing, or covering up of a material fact relating
to any matter within the jurisdiction of a United States department or
agency; making of false or fraudulent statements or representations to
such agency; and making or use of a false or fraudulent writing or
document knowing it to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or entry.2 9 It was enacted to protect "the authorized
functions of governmental departments and agencies from the
perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described.""0
The statute literally requires proof of materiality for conviction only
under the first provision, but the weight of judicial authority requires
such proof for conviction under the second and third.3' Though the
27. ,VILLIA.Ns, at 141.
28. Thus, in Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1940) the court stated that
Ignorance would be a defense 'unless his ignorance resulted from failure to exercise such
discretion as would be expected of a reasonably prudent person."
29. 18 US.C. § 1001 (1964).
30. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941);see United States v, Quirk, 167 F. Supp.
462,464 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
31. Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118, 120 (10th Cir. 1960); Freidus v. United States,
223 F.2d 598, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Rolland v. United States, 200 F.2d 678, 679 (5th Cir.), a'rt.
denied. 345 U.S, 964 (1953), Contra, United States v. Varano, 113 F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Pa. 1953).
One basis for this view is that materiality is required under the perjury statute, 18
U,S.C. § 1621 (1964), and section 1001 is so closely related that materiality is required there
also. See. e.g.. United States v. Hendrickson, 200 F.2d 137, 139 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 926 (1953). Another is that such a highly penal statute must be so interpreted. See
Freidus v. United States, 223 F.2d 598, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The Second Circuit disagrees and
reads the materiality requirement as only applying to the first clause. United States v. Mahler,
363 F.2d 673, 678 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Morchisio, 344 F.2d 653, 666 (2d Cir. 1965).
See also McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249, 253-55 (5th Cir.), ceri. denied. 350 U.S. 934
(1955).
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courts differ somewhat in articulating a standard to define what is
"material." the test can be generally stated as whether the false
statement "has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of
influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a determination
required to be made."-32
It makes no difference whether the agency acts or plans to act on
the statement submitted. The question is whether the statement is
calculated to induce reliance by the federal agency3 3 The mere presence
of the accountant's audit report and his name is calculated to, and
does, induce reliance upon a company's financial statement when
submitted to a government agency. 34 The Securities Exchange
Commission is a government agency within the ambit of the Act,3 and
as the preceding discussion of reliance indicates, the fact that the
Commission neither approves nor recommends securities after such
statements have been submitted to it36 does not exempt the accountant
from possible liability. The false representations need only be submitted
to a governmental department or agency having the power or authority
to act in response to such statements 7.3  Concentrating on the SEC,
since it is primarily with that agency that accountants are involved, the
next question is for what sort of false statements the accountant may
be held responsible?
The accountant most frequently comes into contact with the
Securities Exchange Commission while he is preparing and submitting
an audit report, In auditing a client's books, the auditor examines the
financial statements of his client and expresses an opinion on the
fairness with which they present his financial position and the results
32 keinstock r United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See Freidus v. United
States. 223 1 2d 598 (D C. Cir. 1955) (-could affect or influence"); accord, Brandow v. United
States. 268 t 2d 559 (9th Cir. 1959).
33 BrandoA % United States, 268 F.2d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Allen, 193
V Supp 954, 957 (S D. Cal. 1961). Because it is the statement's intrinsic c~pacity which is the
criterion for con~iction, it is irrelevant that the deception was not practiced to gain a pecuniary
advantage United States v. Me~er, 140 F.2d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1944).
34 ,,c In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957); AMERICAN
INSTITI 11 01i CRTIHED PLBLiC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENTS ON AUDITING PROCEDURE No. 33,
at 20 (1963) [hereinafter cited as STATEMENT 331; L. RAPPAPORT. SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE
AND PR (, IDt 1 22-23 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as RAPPAPORT].
35 United States v Mahler, 363 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1966).
36 Seurities Act 23, 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1964), Exchange Act § 26, 15 U.S.C. § 78z
(1964)
37. See Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964);
Brando % Unitcd States, 268 l-.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1959).
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of operations.3 If he follows generally accepted auditing standards
(those which govern the procedure and evaluation of the client's
records), he should also state whether the client's books are kept in
accord with generally accepted accounting principles.3 9
In preparing this statement, it is the view of both the accounting
profession40 and the Securities Exchange Commission," that the
financial statements on which the accountant reports are not his work
product but that of management. In those instances in which an
accountant himself prepares the financial statements or special purpose
reports from accounts prepared by him or from figures which he
fabricates, prosecution would be clear cut.4" Normally, however, the
only factual representations made by the auditor are those specifically
contained in his report.43 These are contained in the scope paragraph
and the opinion paragraph.
In the scope paragraph, the accountant states, as a fact, that he has
(1) examined the financil statements submitted to him by
management, and (2) that his examination was made in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards and that it accordingly
included such tests of the acgpunting records gnd such other atuditing
procedures as he considered neessary in the circumstances. 4
Except for problems of proof, it should not be difficplt to test the
first representation since on@ qan objeptively determine whether the
financial stftements actually have been examined. As to the second
38. STATEMEpNT 
33
.
39. lt.
40. 1. at 9-1Q,
41. T be fupdqramental and primary respopsibility for the pccuracy of information filed
with the CarriMission and Oisseminatd among the investors rests upon management.
Management does not discharge its obligations in this respect by employment of indepen-
dent public accountants, howpevr reputpble. Accountant's certificates are required not as a
substitute for ira.pagemept's accounting of its stewardship, but a a check upon that
accpunting.
In re Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4 S.E.C. 106, 721 (1939); In re Breeze Corp., Inc., 3 S.E.C.709, 729 (1938). Seg also Social Sec. Adin. Balt. Fed. Cred. Union v. United States, 138 F.
Supp. 639, 057-58 (P. Md. 1956).
42. Since the defendant in United States v. Bepjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 953 (1964) did not submit the fallacious statements to a federal agency, he could not be
convicted under 1001, However, the pro-fornma statement of combined profit and loss, which he
prepargd, was described as reflecting the combined earnings of various corporations which had
been recently acquired by his client. Id. at 860. In truth the acquisition had not been made, and
the defendant accountant was or should have been aware of this fact. Thus, had the statements
been submitted to a federal agency, he could have been convicted under 1001.
43. STATEMENT 33 at 10.
44. Id. at 57;see S.E.C. RULE 2.02, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(b) (1968).
[Vol, 1969: 187
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representation, while there is not always unanimity as to which
accounting principles are generally accepted,4 5 generally accepted
auditing standards are as definitive as most standards of conduct.
For example, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants' standards require that the auditor use "due care" in his
audit." This is equivalent to saying the auditor must not be negligent
in his duties. The courts have had ample experience in determining the
fact of negligence. However, the requirement that violations be wilful
creates special problems if criminal action is brought for submitting
statements which have been negligently compiled. Discussion of these
will be postponed until the general discussion of mens rea.
Generally accepted auditing standards also require that there be a
clear indication of the scope of the auditor's examination, if any, and
the degree of responsibility he intends to assume in all cases in which
an auditor's name is associated with financial statements.17 When
certain auditing procedures have been restricted or totally omitted, the
accountant must clearly state this fact in a qualification to the scope
paragraph of his audit report. 8 Here, questions of compliance are no
more than questions of proof.
In the opinion paragraph, the accountant states that in his opinion
the statements which he has examined fairly reflect the financial
condition of the company as of the balance sheet date and the results
of its operations for the period then ended. Further, he represents that
these operations are reflected in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the
preceding period.4 The accountant who expresses such an unqualified
opinion makes another factual representation in his audit report: that
his state of mind is such that he truly holds the belief which he has
expressed.m When financial statements are presented in a manner which
conflicts with generally accepted accounting principles such an
unqualified opinion would constitute a violation of Section 1001. His
statement that in his "opinion" generally accepted accounting
45 S'ee A.IRICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
AND TIRMINOLOGX BULL. 9 (Final ed. 1961).
46 STATEMENT 33 at 22,
47 Id. at 16
48 li at 15-16,
49 Id at 57, see 17 C.F.R. 210.2-02(c) (1968).
50 See Pre-Trial Memorandum for Defendants at 11, United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831
(S.D N Y June, 1968) appeal docketed, No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. In re Commonwealth
Bond Corp, I S.EC. 13, 24 (1934).
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principles have been followed is a false representation and only the
element of wilfulness need be added to complete the crime.
For example, generally accepted auditing standards require the
disclosure of certain events which occur after the statement date.
Subsequent to the balance sheet date but prior to the issuance of his
report, the auditor may learn of an event directly and materially
affecting the financial statements to which his report
relates-receivables may have been collected or liabilities determined or
settled on a basis substantially different from that previously
anticipated. Generally accepted standards require that such
information be disclosed in the statements5' and that if not disclosed,
the auditor qualify his audit report.
2. Mens Rea
Section 1001 is a catch-all statute and has been applied in situations
dealing with registration of narcotics, 3 false tax forms,54 false
registration of firearms 55 and false home loan applications. Only
infrequently have accountants been charged with its violation. The
variety of circumstances in which the statute is applied invites
confusion over what sort of mental element is required and such
confusion is evident.
The weight of judicial authority holds that the defendant need not
5 1. STATEMENT 33 at 76.
52. Id. at 69. Other events may also occur after the statement date-the company may sign a
restrictive covenant in connection with a loan agreement, or may acquire another business-which
may affect the company's future flexibility and would be of some conceri to the astute investor,
but which are not required to be disclosed. Id. at 76. Because professional standards do not
require such disclosure, it may be unreasonable for the users of financial statements to expect it.
regardless of how useful it might be. See Brief for AICPA as Amicus Curiae at 26-27, United
States v. Simon, Docket Nos. 32828-30 (2d Cir. filed 1968). In Simon, the certifying accountants
were charged with conspiracy to violate the false statements statute. The government contended
that it was criminal not to disclose a substantial increase, subsequent to the statement date, in a
receivable due from an affiliated company. Pre-Trial Memorandum for Prosecution at 3, 11-14,
Pre-Trial Memorandum for Defendants at 47, United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831 (S.D.N.Y.
June 1968), presently on appeal to the second circuit, Docket Nos. 32828-30. If generally accepted
auditing standards are taken as the norm, such a charge was improper; since the post balance
sheet accretion in a receivable has no direct effect upon that asset as of the earlier date, disclosure
is not required. Nor is it necessary for the auditor to qualify his report because of management's
failure to disclose this fact.
53. McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1955).
54. Neely v. United States, 300 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962).
55. United States v. veiler, 385 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1967).
56. Corcoran v. United States, 229 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1956).
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have an evil purpose in order to have "wilfully" violated the statute. 7
The courts applying this standard follow McBrinde v. United States.8
In McBrinde, a doctor was charged with wilfully filing false statements
listing patients to whom he sold narcotics. In this instance, he listed
one patient under a false name. He maintained that he had no evil
motive and that he was protecting the patient, who was a sheriff, from
community disapproval. The doctor contested the instruction given by
the trial court that to prove wilfulness the government need only prove
that the forbidden act be done "deliberately and with knowledge" and
not that the defendant have an "evil intent." The Fifth Circuit
affirmed on the basis of this instruction and differentiated the
requirement of wilfulness contained in the false statement statute from
that found in other statutes.59 The court held that precedents in which
other courts had defined wilfulness in the context of other statutes as
requiring bad or evil purpose were not in point.10
It follows, then, that mistake of law, at least in one sense, would not
be a defense to prosecution for violation of Section 1001. If the
defendant mistakes the law as to what is false or what is generally
accepted as an auditing or accounting standard, his mistake may be
merely negligent and a bona fide defense may be possible. However,
since he need not have an evil purpose and need only submit his
statement deliberately and with knowledge that it is false, it makes no
difference whether the individual knows that the submitting of false
statements is prohibited. In. this situation, at least, mistake of law
would be no defense.
Not all courts, however, are willing to accept that no evil purpose is
required for a violation of the false statements statute. In United States
v. Weiler,"' the Third Circuit called attention to the fact that
"wilfulness . . . requires proof of an evil motive. 62 In United States
57 Hirsch v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962); McBride
v. United States, 225 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1955); Walker v. United States, 192 F.2d 47 (10th Cir.
1951)
58. 225 I 2d 249 (5th Cir. 1955).
59 Id at 254
60 Id at 254, citing Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
61 385 I 2d 63 (3d Cir. 1967).
62 Defendant had submitted an application under the Federal firearms act. One of the
qucstions on the application was whether he had been convicted for any crime that was punishable
for over one year. He had been convicted of assault and battery, but paroled for two years. He
naintained that he was mistaken in the interpretation of the statute under which he had been
convicted The court held that this was no defense. They rejected the argument that "there cannot
bc a conviction for making a wilfully false statement when the statement made in the answer
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v. Buckley,63 the district court analyzed the need for evil purpose in
light of the kind of instrument that was being filed and the need for
absolute prohibition of false submission. The defendant in Buckley was
accused of warranting in a contract filed with the government that no
one involved in the procurement of the contract had received a
commission, percentage or contingent fee, as payment for such
procurement. The court could have found that such a person had been
involved in procuring the contract, but, because the defendant had no
evil purpose,64 and because the transaction was not that which was
really aimed at by the warranty clause, the court dismissed the action.3
In one Tenth Circuit case, the court cut through all of the questions
about mens rea and stated that "[A]II the government was required to
do was to prove that the record was false. To illustrate: If the
government proved that appellant purchased 50,000 grains of morphine
and that his dispensation record showed that he had dispensed only
20,000 grains, it would have proved its case.""6
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, most of the courts
require that the defendant know the statement to be false, though at
least one case contains dictum that would dispense with this
requirement. This means that either reckless or intentional falsification
would suffice for confiscation. If the accountant or auditor is negligent
in either carrying on his activities or in ascertaining the standards he
represents that he is following, his actions, though morally
reprehensible, should not suffice for conviction under the false
statements statute. However, in some jurisdictions, i.e., those which
would follow the Tenth Circuit rationale expressed in their hypothetical
above, all that would need to be shown is that the accountant did not
do as he represented. It is submitted that this rationale is unacceptable.
Though his actions in filing the statements are wilful in the sense that
he knows what he is physically doing, he has in no way adverted to
requires expert or special knowledge on the part of the answerer." Id. at 65. The court admitted
that there may be situations where such a rule would be applicable, but stated that in this case
the applicant had requested agency action. To have the agency act he was required to make a
representation. "He cannot, at least as a matter of law, be relieved of the consequences of a
material misrepresentation when the means of ascertaining the truthfulness of his statement were
available." Id. at 65..This seems in conflict with the recognition of a requirement for an evil
motive. Id. at 67.
63. 49 F. Supp. 993 (D.D.C. 1943).
64. Id. at 994.
65. Id. at 995.
66. Mitchell v. United States, 143 F.2d 953, 956 (10th Cir. 1944).
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the falsity of the statements. His liability, if any, would be civil rather
than criminal.
C. Mail Fraud
I. A4ctus Rea
The purpose of the mail fraud statute67 is to prevent the mails from
being associated with or used in any wilful scheme or artifice to
defraud.' It requires proof of two elements: the devising of a scheme
or artifice to defraud or obtain money by false pretenses and the use
in some manner of the mails to transmit a false document in
furtherance of the scheme."
Artifice and scheme mean much the same thing: a devious,
contriving, disingenous, subtle, deceptive, cunning and tricky plan, act
or method.' The scheme need not be one which will be successful when
completed;7 any scheme reasonably calculated to defraud a person of
ordinary comprehension is within the statute. 72  Factual
misrepresentations are not necessary,73 though they are also within the
statute, and wilful non-disclosure of certain facts may likewise subject
a person to prosecution.74
Actual reliance by the intended victim is not necessary for
conviction75 nor is it relevant whether the perpetrator expects to or does
receive a benefit, pecuniary or otherwise, from his scheme.71 Therefore,
67 18 U.S C. 1341 (1964).
68 Parr v United States, 363 U.S. 370. 389 (1960).
69 Gold v. United States, 350 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1965); Beck v. United States, 305 F.2d 595
(00th Cir ). crt denied. 371 U.S. 890. (1962); United States v. Shavin, 287 F.2d 647 (7th
Cir. 1961)
70 Stockton v. United States, 205 F. 462 (7th Cir. 1913); Horman v. United States, 116 F.
350 (6th Cir ), cert denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902).
71 -armer v United States, 226 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1955); Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d
533 (8th Cir I, cert denied, 312 U.S. 692 (1940); Rimmerman v. United States, 186 F. 307 (8th
Cir 1911). Brooks v. United States, 146 F. 223 (8th Cir. 1906).
72 E g . Oesting v, United States, 234 F. 304 (9th Cir, 1916), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 647
(1917), Rimmerman v. United States, 186 F. 307 (8th Cir. 1911); Brooks v. United States, 146
F. 223 (8th Cir. 1906).
73 I g . Silverman v. United States, 213 F.2d 405 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954);
Henderson v. United States, 202 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1953); Fournier v. United States, 58 F.2d 3
(7th Cir 1932).
74. Irwin v. United States, 338 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 911 (1965);
United States v Miller, 210 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. Tex. 1962).
75 Adjmi v. United States. 346 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 823 (1965); Blue
v. United States, 138 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 736 (1944); see Erwin v.
United States, 242 F.2d 336 (6th tir. 1957).
76 See Calnay v. United States, I F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1924). See generally Butler v. United
States, 53 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1931).
Washington University Open Scholarship
200 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1969: 187
although the accountant receives only his standard fee, he may be held
to have violated the mail fraud statute.7
There is no need to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge
that the mails would be used in connection with the scheme to
defraud 7 8-a fair inference will suffice. 79 If a person acts with
knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course
of business,"° or if such use can reasonably be foreseen even though it
is not actually intended, he "causes" the mails to be used as
contemplated by the statute."' Preparing or certifying financial
statements or special purpose reports which he knows are false and
which he knows will be used by his client to obtain credit,"2 sell
securities,8 3 or finance a new process84 would suffice to charge the
accountant with mail fraud. Adding to the accountant's liability, since
each mailing constitutes a separate offense," each of these transactions
would support at least a two count indictment: the mailing to the client
and the latter's mailing to the victim.
2. Mens Rea
The mail fraud statute prohibits only artifices to defraud. The courts
have said that this means the prosecution must prove an intent to
defraud.8 The intent need not be proven by direct evidence; 7 as in the
77. The size of the fee appears to be irrelevant. See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
78. E.g., United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155 (1914).
79. E.g., United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440 (1917); Bruce v. United States, 351 F.2d
318 (5th Cir. 1965); Marvin v. United States, 279 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1960); Belvin v. United
States, 273 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1960).
80. Belvin v. United States, 273 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1960).
81. Marvin v. United States, 279 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1960); ef. Pereira v. United States, 347
U.S. 1 (1954).
82. E.g., United States v. Epstein, 152 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1957); United States v,
Yorsaner, 20 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y. 1937). Interestingly, the court in United States v. Epstein,
supra at 584, speaks of one Segal who was Epstein's accountant. Segal was asked to prepare
financial statements reflecting the financial position of Epstein's company for the purpose of
acquiring credit for it. At Epstein's direction, Segal typed on his own stationery and signed a
letter of transmittal addressed to a particular prospect. Both the letter and a copy of the statement
were delivered by Segal to Epstein for mailing. Although the court indicated that Segal knew of
certain improprieties contained in his statements and derived from Epstein's accounts, it made
no mention of any criminal action brought against the public accountant.
83. See United States v. White, 124 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1941); United States v. Simon, 66 Crim.
831 (S.D.N.Y. June 1968), appeal docketed, No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Getchell, 282 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1960).
85. Hanrahan v. United States, 348 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Atkinson v. United States, 344
F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1965).
86. E.g., United States v. Shipp, 359 F.2d 185 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 903 (1966);
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other crimes requiring a wilful violation, a series of acts innocent in
themselves when considered as a whole may provide ample basis to
infer the required intent."
L nited States '. Benjamin" illustrates the use of such inferences. In
Benjamin, the accountant prepared a balance sheet reflecting total
assets of $7.8 million and net worth of $3.7 million, which he described
as an accurate and true presentation of the company's net worth. The
following month he went to California to investigate a possible
acquisition for his client. The company failed to pay an expense
advance which had been promised. The hotel terminated both his food
and telephone service for nonpayment of bills. Still, upon his return,
he reported total assets of $8.7 million and a $0.9 million increase in
net worth, and extolled the prospects of the company. The court stated
that " . . the cumulation of instances, each explicable only by
extreme credulity or professional inexpertness, may have a probative
force immensely greater than any one of them alone," 90 and upheld the
defendant's nail fraud conviction." I
Williams % Umted States. 278 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Kyle, 257 F.2d
559. 564 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 937 (1959); United States v. Corlin, 44 F. Supp.
940. 943 (S D Cal. 1942); cf. Yusem v. United States, 8 F.2d 6 (3d Cir. 1925).
K7 1 g , Beck v United States, 305 F.2d 595 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890, 895
(1962). Nassan v. United States, 126 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1942).
88 S'ee United States v. White, 124 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1941); accord, United States v. Dardi,
330 I- 2d 316, 325 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Valenti, 134 F.2d 362, 365 (2d Cir.), cert.
demed, 319 U.S. 761 (1943); Nassan v. United States, 126 F.2d 613 (4th Cir 1942); Wood v.
United States, 125 F. Supp. 42, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
89 328 I- 2d 854 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied. 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
90 Id at 862 quoting Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. White, 124 F.2d 181, 185
(2d Cir. 1941).
91 Similarly, in United States v. White, 124 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1941), the accountant, in
preparing financial statements, only regurgitated data furnished him by his client and the
corporate books. Included among the assets, at 872% of its face value, was a receivable
purchased by the company for less than 25% of such value. Among the notes receivable was a
claim for $8,000 representing services rendered a publishing corporation which had been acquired
by the client only the year before at a cost of $150. The debtor corporation published a magazine
having no subscribers, had no assets other than the stock of its purchaser, operated out of the
same office, and used the same secretary as the acquiring corporation. The court stated that while
some accountants disagreed as to the realization of profits on the mere purchase of assets, the
defendant had to be very credulous to believe what was represented to him. Id. at 183. The court
held, "It is true that all these instainces, taken singly, do not prove beyond a question that White
kneA that the statements he prepared were padded with false entries; but logically the sum is often
greater than the aggregate of the parts .. ."Id. at 185.
92. Libel v. United States, 364 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1014 (1967);
United States v Sheiner, 273 F. Supp. 977, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Slakoff v. United States, 8
F 2d 9 (3d Cir. 1925), a financial statement was sent through the mails and contained grossly
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Even if it is clear the defendant was unaware of the falsity of the
statements mailed, courts may infer that he recklessly or deliberately
shut his eyes to the obvious.12 Both of these situations have been held
sufficient for conviction. Some courts have gone even further. In
United States v. Stone, for example, the court stated that:
[I]gnorance of facts set up as a defense is unavailing where the
defendant, by the exercise of due diligence, could have become aware of
his mistakes . . . . [I]f any particular appellant were [sic]' ignorant of
facts from the knowledge of which alone, fraudulent intent could be
inferred, he cannot be convicted of a violation of the present statutes,
unless his ignorance resulted from failure to exercise such discretion in
ascertaining the facts as would be expected of a reasonably prudent
person.93
This is an extreme position. Normally, good faith is an absolute
defense to a prosecution for mail fraud.94 Though it is an affirmative
defense and must be proven by the defendants," it should preclude
negligence as sufficient mens rea for conviction.96
The recent United States v. Simon," however, appears to represent
a departure from the weight normally given a defense of good faith.
The defendants in Simon were convicted of mail fraud in connection
with their audit and certification of the 1962 financial statements of
Continental Vending Machine Corporation. The prosecution charged
that, regarding a substantial receivable due Continental from Valley,
its major affiliate, the defendants had intentionally drafted a
misleading footnote to the statements which had the effect of reducing
Continental's exposure to loss on the asset.9 Reported among the
assets were accounts receivable from Valley in the amount of $3.5
million and a parenthetical reference to footnote 2Y The current
misrepresented facts. The court held that the defendant was under a duty to make an investigation.
He would be subject to the act, if, in failing to make such an investigation he acted with gross
negligence.
93. Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 75 (6th Cir. 1940).
94. Steiger v. United States, 373 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1967); Beck v. United States, 305 F.2d
595 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); United States v. March, 251 F. Supp. 642
(M.D. Pa. 1966).
95. Steiger v. United States, 373 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1967).
96. See notes 20 to 24 supra, and accompanying text.
97. United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831 (S.D.N.Y. June 1968), appeal docketed. No. 32828-
30 (2d Cir. 1968).
98. Trial Memorandum for Prosecution at 14-16, United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831
(S.D.N.Y. June 1968), appeal docketed. No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968).
99. Continental Vending Machine Corp., Consolidated Balance Sheet, Sept. 30, 1962, reprinted
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liabilities included more than $8.2 million of long term debt due within
one year but there was no indication that Valley was among the
creditors. 00 Reflected under the classification "long term debt," in
addition to parenthetical references to footnotes 2 and 7, was a payable
to Valley of approximately $0.5 million."0 ' Footnote 7 contained a
schedule of long term debt and disclosed a liability to Valley of more
than one million dollars . 1 2 Footnote 2 disclosed that the Valley
receivables less the Valley payables were secured by Valley's equity in
certain marketable securities, the current value of which exceed the net
amount receivable.103 Generally accepted accounting principles require
as Appendix A in Pre-Trial Memorandum for Defendants, United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831
(S.D.N Y June 1968). appeal docketed. No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968).
100 Id
101 Id
102 footnote 7 read as follows:
The amounts of long-term debt payable during each of the years ending September 30,
1964 through 1967 are as follows:
Year Ending
1964 $2,201,055
1965 1,141,039
1966 693,081
1967 373,777
Thereafter 3,462,187
$7,871,139
The amounts of long-term debt, including the portion due within one year, on which
interest is payable currently or has been discounted in advance, are as follows:
Payable currently:
At 6% a year .............. ........................ 9,292,012
At various other rates, principally 12% a year ................. 1,586,049
Discounted in advance, principally at 6% a year:
Valley Commercial Corp., affiliate ......................... 1,029,475
Others ..................... ......................... 4,003,034
Noninterest-bearing .. ....................................... 164,357
$16,074,927
Approximately $9,144,000 of these amounts was secured by collateral.
103 Footnote 2 read as follows
The amount receivable from Valley Commercial Corp. (an affiliated company of which
Mr Harold Roth is an officer, director and stockholder) bears interest at 12% a year. Such
amount, less the balance of the notes payable to that company, is secured by the
assignment to the Company of Calley's equity in certain marketable securities. As of
February 15, 1963, the amount of such equity at current market quotations exceeded the
net amount receivable.
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that assets and liabilities regardless of source not be offset unless a
right to offset exists."" No such right existed in the present situation"'
because the Valley payable represented notes that Continental's
subsidiaries, via Continental, had borrowed from Valley which had in
turn discounted them with banks. Therefore, Continental's liability (as
endorser) on such notes, while contingent,"" was to third parties, not
to Valley, and for that reason could not be offset against the Valley
receivables. However, the defendants had secured and acted pursuant
to a formal legal opinion of Continental's outside counsel which in
effect stated that the current value of the collateral equaled the gross
amount of Continental's receivables at the balance sheet date."' 7
Therefore, by stating that such value adequately secured the nel
amount of the receivables, the accountants were understating the
existing facts of which they had knowledge at the time. Accountants
have a duty to express an expert opinion as to the fairness of financial
statements taken as a whole and if any item contained therein makes
the presentation of such statements unfair or improper, the accountants
are required to appropriately qualify their opinions or to render adverse
opinions."18 While the balance sheet properly reflected the items
"broad," footnote 2, in light of other balance sheet figures, conveyed
the misleading impression that the two balances could be offset. Even
a finding of negligence on this ground must be questioned in light of
the circumstances confronting the defendants at the time of their
certification. Having been made subjectively aware by the opinion of
counsel that the collateral was adequate for the gross amount of the
receivable, the defendants could reasonably have concluded that the
statements were fair and true in their presentation-that such collateral
exceeded the net amount receivable."'"
104. . \IIRICAN INSTITUTI- I C RTII I-1) PL II K \( ('()t N \N rs. ( ('01 NI IM , RI-M ARCH ANI)
TiR3INOIoGos Bui I+TI\. ch. 3. § B (final ed. 1961).
105. Id.: ANIIRICA A.\CCOUNTING \SSO(IATION. A( (0 TIN(, \\D RI PORTING STANDARDS
I-OR (.ORPORATI INANCIAL STA1I.lI\'rs 17 (1967).
106. U.C.C. § 3-414. ei q.
107. See Letter from Arthur N. Field to Lybrand Ross Bros. & Montgomery. Feb. 14, 1963,
reprinted in Pre-Trial Memorandum for I)efendants at 38-39. United States v. Simon, 66 Crim.
831 (S.D.N.Y. June 1968), appealdockeiedL No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968).
108. STATI-.3,'-T 33 at 56. 58-59 (1963).
109. Independent Auditors may not, with impunit and without further investigation, rely on
information supplied by management. see, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir),
cert. denied. 377 U.S. 953 (1964); c/. United States v. \Vhite. 124 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1941), The
auditor's expertise is not in law. O'Connor v. Ludlam. 92 F.2d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1937). Therefore,
his good faith reliance upon those whose expertise offers presumptive knowledge is both necessary
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The Simon case illustrates the common problem running through the
statutes, i.e., a failure to properly articulate the standard that will be
applied in assessing the necessary mental element of the crime. Since,
obviously, the circuits differ in the standards that they do apply, and
since a financial statement of a large corporation is sent through the
mails to virtually all states, the guilt or innocence of a defendant could
well depend on the jurisdiction in which the federal government brings
action. A more definitive answer to the necessary mens rea is
impossible in light of this confusion.
D. Conspiracy
A conspiracy is a combination formed by agreement in order to
accomplish some unlawful purpose coupled with some overt act in
furtherance of the plan."" It has been said to involve a deliberate
plotting to violate the law,"' whose secrecy renders its detection
difficult,"! and whose numerous members may make success more
likely." ' The federal conspiracy statute penalizes two types of
conspiracy: that to commit any offense against the United States and
that to defraud the United States or any of its agencies."' The first type
encompasses mail fraud and the anti-fraud provisions of the securities
laws and the second covers conspiracies to submit false statements to
a federal department or agency.11
Traditionally, conspiracy requires proof of a specific intent to violate
the law."' The same intent necessary to commit a substantive offense
and is evidence of his good faith. United States v. Painter, 314 F.2d 939, 943 (4th Cir.). cert
denied, 374 U S. 831 (1963); United States v. Crosby. 294 F.2d 928, 942.43 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied,
368 Ii S 984 (1962), cl. United States v. Danser 26 F.R.D. 580, 587 (E.D. Mass. 1959). aft'd.
281 F.2d 492 (Ist Cir. 1960).
110 is U S C 371 (1964); e.g . Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912)
(conspiracy requires not only an unlawful combination but also an overt act for an indictable
offense to occur); Bannon v. United States, 156 U.S. 464, 468 (1895) (any one of the conspirators
can perform the overt act, which is then inputed to all other co-conspirators); United States v.
Wooton, 29 t-. 702, 703 (E.D.S.C. 1887). See generally, R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 527-49
(1965)
Il1 e e g . Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946); United States v.
Rabinohich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915).
112. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946); United States v. Rabinowich, 238
U.S 78, 88 (1915).
113 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946); United States v. Rabinowich,
238 L S 78, 88 (1915). Se(, generally. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 535 (1965).
114 18 U S.C. 371 (1964).
115 United States v. Ausmeier, 152 F.2d 349, 358 (2d Cir. 1945). See also United States v.
Webb, 359 1- 2d 558, 562 (6th Cir. 1966).
116 1 g , Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1948).
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is required for a conspiracy to commit such offense"' and, if such
intent is present, the conspiracy is complete and all members are guilty
as soon as any member of the combination does any act in furtherance
of the plan." 8 Both elements may be proven inferentially"' but the
Supreme Court has warned that inference may not be piled upon
inference in attempts to gain conviction of this crime. 2 ' Merely
agreeing to the plan, without more, will not constitute the overt act
required by the statute' and neither association with a known
criminal 22 nor knowledge that something illegal is happening or about
to happen will, without more, make one a conspirator.' Still, the
tendency to find guilt by association is strong 24 and conspiracy has
been regarded by many as an arbitrary and highly prejudicial means
of law enforcement. 21 In the context of conspiracy, as well in mail
fraud, Simon illustrates the problem of inferring mens rea from a series
of actions in the context of professional responsibility.
In Simon,2 1 in addition to mail fraud, the defendants were charged
117. Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672 (1959); Danielson v. United States, 321 F.2d 441,
445 (9th Cir. 1963); Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960). See also Guardalibini v. United States, 128 F.2d 984 (5th
Cir. 1942) (intent to commit the substantive offense is necessary to convict for conspiracy even
where such intent is not a necessary element of the substantive offense).
118. Deli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957); McClanahan v. United States, 230 F.2d
919 (5th Cir. 1956); accord, Dye v. State, 90 Ga. App. 736, 738, 84 S.E.2d 116, 117 (1954).
119. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943); United States v. Manton, 107
F.2d 834 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied, 309 U.S. 664 (1938).
120. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943); Causey v. United States, 352 F.2d
203, 207 (5th Cir. 1965).
121. See United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940); United States v. Webb, 359 F.2d 558
(6th Cir. 1966).
122. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940); Causey v. United States, 352 F.2d 203,
207 (5th Cir. 1965).
123. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
124. See Krulewich v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 457 (1949); United States v. Ausemeir,
152 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1945).
125. United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.), affd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940); see
1925 ATTORNEY GENERAL's ANNUAL REPORT 5, 6, quoting Taft, C.J., presiding over The
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges. See also B. CARDOZO, NATURE OF TIlE JUDICIAL PROCESS
51 (1928).
126. 66 Crim. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In addition to mail fraud and conspiracy, the government
charged criminality on two additional grounds.
First, the indictment charged that the cash position reported in the statements was false in that
the balances at two banks were restricted and not drawable on demand. Therefore, rather than
having nearly $300,000 on deposit, under the government's contention, the company was
overdrawn. A few days before the end of its fiscal year, the company borrowed $750,000 from
each of two different banks under the usual (for Continental) thirty day term loan arrangement,
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with conspiracy to file a false form 10-K report with the Securities
Exchange Commission. The defendants had accepted as adequate
security for a $3.5 million receivable from Valley (an affiliate of
Continental) its equity in the latter's securities. Eighty per cent of these
securities belonged to Roth, the controlling shareholder of both
companies, and had not been registered with the Commission and had
been previously pledged by him to various financial institutions as
security on certain personal loans. In a note to the financial statements,
the net amount of the receivable was described as being secured by
Valley's equity in "certain marketable securities," the current market
of which exceeded the amount secured. The government contended that
the defendants had planned and intended to file the report containing
financial statements which mere materially fraudulent, and charged
that the defendants had acted criminally since they had (1) not
disclosed that the securities pledged by Valley were those of
Continental, (2) falsely stated that the securities were marketable; and
(3) fraudulently accepted such securities as collateral when in fact the
both loans being covered by one letter agreement providing that terms of the agreement.could
not be modified or varied unless done in writing and contained no restrictions on money loaned.
The banks' replies to the standard bank confirmation sent by the defendants indicated that the
accounts were subject to withdrawal by check, and, while there was apparently some unwritten
understanding between Continental and the banks that it would not draw upon the loan proceeds,
an officer of one bank testified at the defendant's first trial that the loan proceeds were "cash in
every sense of the word .. ." Moreover, a prosecution witness at that trial agreed that the actual
use of the proceeds should determine their proper accounting treatment. They were in fact drawn
upon fully, and the judge at the first trial charged the jury that, as a matter of law, such funds
were not restricted, Id. at 52-54. The government apparently chose not to press this issue at the
second trial 'iee generally, Brief for Prosecution, United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831
(S.D.N Y. 1968), appeal docketed, No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968).
Secondly, the government charged that Valley was a conduit for the transfer of funds from
Continental to Roth, and that the Valley receivable should have been reflected as a receivable from
Roth. Id at 27 The defendants were not permitted to inspect Valley's books, Brief for Defendants
at 31. United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), appeal docketed, No. 32828-30
(2d Cir. 1968), and since their audit engagement encompassed only Continental and not Valley,
it was not their province to determine the use to which a company not under their audit put the
funds advanced to it by their client. Id. at 32. The only duties the defendants had with regard to
the receivable were segregating it in the balance sheet, checking its collectibility, and disclosing
its source as being an affiliate. Id. at 33. In fact, the defendants did more than their duty required
for they disclosed that Roth %as in control of both companies and thereby permitted the inference
that the transactions were not at arm's length. Moreover, Form 10-K itself requires that the
managemnent not the auditor- disclose on Form 10-K any material direct or indirect
transactions to which directors or officers were a party. Id. at 50. On the other hand, even the
S.E.C 's accounting regulations do not require the auditor to disclose amounts due indirectly from
such persons See 17 C.F.R. § 210.5-04 (1968); Brief for Defendants at 50, United States v.
Simon, 66 Crim 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), appeal docketed, No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968).
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"equity" was nothing more than a second lien on the holdings)"2
However, "[a]ccountants should not be held to a standard higher than
that recognized by their profession,' 28 and there is no requirement of
generally accepted auditing principles that an accountant must
specifically disclose that an issuer holds its own securities for debts
owed to it. 2 1 While unregistered "control" stock may not be sold in a
public offering, 3' there is no prohibition against sales of such stock by
direct private placement 3' and, considering the large block available in
this instance, private placement would be the most likely as well as the
most profitable means of ready disposal or marketability. 3 2
Furthermore, the fact that at least two large financial institutions felt
adequately secured by such securities is strong evidence of their
marketability and therefore supports the defendants' treatment of the
securities. 33 Moreover, as a condition precedent to accepting such
127. Record at 1, United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), appeal docketed,
No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968).
128. Escott v. Bar Chris Const. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
129. Brief for Defendants at 46, United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), appeal
docketed, No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968).
130. See Securities Act §§ 5, 2(11), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77b(l 1) (1964). In S.E.C, v. Guild
Films Inc., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960), the court held that pledgees
of such control shares, who knew when they received the shares as collateral that immediate sale
thereof was almost inevitable if they hoped to recover their loans, were likewise subject to the
prohibitions of section 5. In dictum, however, the court said that even a bona fide pledgee of such
shares would be subject to the registration requirements and it is generally this dictum upon which
the prosecution in Simon based its assertion that the defendants should have known that Roth's
equity in the Valley shares, which he had pledged with the banks, were subject to registration prior
to sale and hence not marketable.
For further treatment of the problem raised by Guild Filns, see I L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 645-51 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. See generally Fox v. Glickman
Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1011-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
131. S.E.C. v. Guild Films Inc., 279 F.2d 485, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 364 U.S. 819 (1960);
see Securities Act § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(I) (1964). Nor is an entirely intrastate offering of
control stock subject to registration. See Securities Act § 3(a)(1), 15 US.C. § 77c(a'(I) (1964).
But see R. BAKER & V. CAREY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 464 (3d. ed. Supp.
1968).
132. See Brief for Defendants at 44, United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831 (S.D.N.Y. June,
1968), appeal docketed. No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Royal Trust Co. v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y, 247 F. 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1917); Elliot v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907);
R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 590 (3d ed. 1959); Note, Duties
of Controlling Shareholders in Transfering Their Shares. 54 HARV. L. REV. 648 (1941). But see
R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 464 (3d ed. Supp. 1968).
133. Brief for Defendants at 44, United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831 (S.D.N.Y. June, 1968),
appeal docketed. No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968); see R. MONTGOMERY. AUDITING 145 (8th ed.
1957). But see S.E.C. v. Guild Films Inc., 279 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
819 (1960); J. Sargent, Pledges and Foreclosure Rights Under the Securities Act of 1933, 45 VA.
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securities as adequate collateral, the defendants had specifically
requested a written legal opinion by Continental's counsel that the
securities adequately secured the receivables. The letter of counsel
stated that the present market value of the collateral was
approximately $3.5 million over and above all liens. While it is true
that an auditor serves no function if all he does is to rely on what the
management and its representatives tell him, it is also true that an
accountant's expertise is not in the area of expressing legal
conclusions.' The court, however, found the defendants -guilty.
In two other cases in which accountants were convicted of
conspiracy, both the act and the intent were proven inferentially. 13
However, the basis for these findings was more substantial than in
Simon. In both Benjamin and White, the accountants had violated the
standards of their profession at the very least. The client in United
State. v. Ben jamin"'I was undertaking a public offering of securities
and Howard, the accountant, although aware of the company's
financial difficulties, nevertheless issued a report extolling its prospects.
He had previously issued a report in which he falsely represented that
he had performed certain auditing work when in reality he had merely
lent his name and professional designation to a false statement
prepared by the company. The accountant in United States v. White 37
lacked independence. When the president of his client told him that it
had a substantial number of large receivables, White sent out
confirmations. Upon receiving a negative reply from a major debtor,
he confronted the president with this discrepancy but was advised not
L, RE% 885 (1959). See gvnerallv S.E.C. PROBLEMS OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS AND
TRANSI I R, IN UNDERWRITING (Israels ed. 1962).
134. Accountants profess to speak with knowledge when certifying to an agreement
between an audit and the entries in the books audited, but there is no suggestion . . . that
a stat-ment by an auditor that notes are secured by the provisions of a trust deed is an
assertion of knowledge rather than an expression of opinion. To suggest that a title
examiner is guilty of fraud if he erroneously certified a title because he had honestly
mlsconceived the legal significance of a provision in a deed would doubtless horrify . . .
members of the legal profession. There is no reason to hold accountants to a higher
standard when they deal with legal documents.
O'Connor % Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1937). See "Functions of the Certified Public
Accountant", ,\ddress by J S. Schumann, to Sullivan & Cromwell Staff, New York City, March,
1967, in 119671 HASKI,' & SELLS SELECTED PAPERS 185, 196.
135 United States v. Benjamin. 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 377 U.S. 953 (1964);
United States % white, 124 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1941).
136 328 F 2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nora., 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
137 124 1 2d (51 (2dCir. 1941).
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to press the issue for fear of antagonizing the debtor. The defendant
investigated no further. When he discovered that the president had
"borrowed" substantial amounts from the corporation on numerous
occasions, White, at the president's insistence, charged the thefts to the
capital account. In addition, the company had purchased a receivable
having a face amount of $74,000 for $20,000 and then assigned it to a
subsidiary for other assets. The assignment agreement provided that the
subsidiary was to receive the first $22,000 of collections, the excess to
go to the parent. White, without disclosing the assignment, set up the
receivable at a net relizable value of $13,000, thus including in the
books both the receivable and the assets received in the assignment.
A conspiracy charge may be particularly useful when prosecution for
one of the other crimes is impossible because the jurisdictional
standards are not met.'38 Furthermore, conspiracy is separate from the
substantive offense (it is the illegal combination at which the statute is
aimed)139 and may be charged where the "error" is uncovered before a
substantive crime is committed or has progressed far enough to be
considered an attempt. If the substantive crime is committed, the
defendant may be convicted of both offenses. 4 ' At times, the
apparently anomalous result may occur that a defendant convicted of
conspiracy will be subjected to a greater fine than if he had been
convicted of only the completed substantive offense. The defendants in
United States v. Simon were convicted on two counts of mail fraud and
one of conspiracy.' 4 ' One of them received a $7,000 fine: $1,000
maximum on each of the two mail fraud charges and $5,000 maximum
on the conspiracy count.' The anomaly is more apparent than real,
since a conspiracy is a crime in and of itself, and one believed by some
to be more sinister than the completed offense.4 3
138. See United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831 (S.D.N.Y. June, 1968), appeal docketed, No.
32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968) (one of the charges was conspiracy to ile a false statement with the
S.E.C.; prosecution under section 1001 was not possible because the financial statements had not
been submitted to the Commissioner).
139. United States v. Bazzell, 187 F.2d 878, 884 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (195 1).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831 (S.D.N.Y. June, 1968), appeal docketed,
No. 32828-30 (2d Cir. 1968).
141. Id.
142. Wall St. Journal, 27 September 1968, at 4, col. 4.
143. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946); United States v. Rabinowich,
238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915).
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E. Aiders and A bettors
The purpose of the aider and abettor provisions"' is to punish those
persons who are incompetent to commit certain crimes as principals.4 '
The existence of a preconceived agreement is not necessary for the
statute to apply"' but there must be a person who can be found guilty
as a principal."7 If, because of the absence of planning, a person is
found innocent of a conspiracy charge, he can still be found guilty
under the aider and abettor statute if his assistance takes place
simultaneously with the commission of a crime.4 8 Though he will be
guilty of conspiracy if he agrees to commit a crime and does some
overt act,"' he cannot be an aider and abettor unless a crime is actually
committed.10 As with conspiracy, passive acquiesence in a crime does
not make one an aider and abettor.'5' Accordingly, under the aiding
and abetting provision, no criminal responsibility attaches to a
principal for the acts of his agent unless the principal aids, advises or
encourages his agent's criminal act."2 An aider and abettor must act
with knowledge that the offense is to be committed'3 and, if he does
so, is deemed to have intended all the natural and probable
consequences of the offense.' 5 '
This statute appears to impose no criminal responsibility on the
auditor beyond the other provisions of the Criminal Code. All acts
performed in preparing his audit report are adequately encompassed by
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
145 E g . United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1966);
Swanne Soon Young Pang v. United States, 209 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1953); United States v.
Snyder, 14 F 554 (C.C.D. Minn. 1882).
146 Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949).
147. Edwards v. United States, 286 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1960); Karrell v. United States, 181
F.2d 981 (10th Cir. 1950). But see Meredith v. United States, 238 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1956); I.C.C.
v. Bue Diamond Products, 93 F. Supp. 688 (W.D. Iowa 1950), affd, 192 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1951),
both holding that it is not necessary that the principal be first convicted.
148. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949).
149. Hyde v United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359 (1912).
150 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,209 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
151 See United States v. Dellaro, 99 F.2d 781, 783 (2d Cir. 1938).
152. E.g., in In re Myers, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 92, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 72,114
(1962), the SEC indefinitely suspended an accountant for impropriety. Myers had acted beyond
his authority as a partner at a time when the senior partner was not present and no other member
or employee knew what he was doing. Because of these circumstances proceedings against the firm
were dismissed and its name was ordered stricken from the record. In re Myers is discussed in
detail inlra
153. United States v. Turnipseed, 272 F.2d 106 (7th Cir. 1959).
154. McClanahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956).
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the statutes discussed earlier. For example, if he knowingly and
intentionally certifies to false and fraudulent financial statements which
are sent to the Securities Exchange Commission or through the mail
to corporate shareholders or prospective investors or sellers, he is
subject as a principal to prosecution under Section 1001, false
statements, or the mail fraud statute. If he agrees to certify such
statements for any of the foregoing purposes but decides at the last
moment not to do so, he is subject as a principal to prosecution for
conspiracy. If he makes no certification or audit report but merely
advises a layman how to prepare such financial statements and how to
write an audit report with the intention to have the report used in any
fraudulent manner and the layman then destroys the statements and the
report without ever having used them, the auditor has not aided and
abetted in the commission of any crime but is still subject as a principal
to prosecution for conspiracy.
On the other hand, the aider and abettor provisions significantly
broaden the auditor's exposure to fine and imprisonment under the
securities laws by allowing conviction on multiple grounds. For
example, although the auditor as such does not deal in the purchase
and sale of securities, he may aid and abet others who are so engaged,,"
and be prosecuted both for mail fraud in his own right, and for using
the fraudulent or otherwise illegal purchase and sales of securities under
the aider and abettor statutes.
F. Securities Act of 1933
Both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act authorize the
Securities Exchange Commission to transmit to the Attorney General
evidence of suspected criminal violations and provide that the latter, in
his discretion, may initiate criminal proceedings.' 6 When the violations
of other statutes is indicated, the Commission will notify the
appropriate *state or federal agency. 5 7 Prosecutions under the Securities
Act are brought pursuant to Section 24.111
1. Actus Rea
Section 24111 can be divided into two parts. The first part penalizes
155. See, e.g., In re William Todd, Inc., 32 S.E.C. 537 (1951); In re Henry P. Rosenfeld, 30
S.E.C. 941, 944 n. 3 (1950); In re Richard K. Fudge, 30 S.E.C. 334, 338 n. I 1 (1949).
156. Securities Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1964); Exchange Act § 21(e), 15
U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964).
157. S.E.C. ANN. REPT., 39 (1942).
158. S.E.C. ANN. REP., 131-32 (1964).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964).
[Vol. 1969: 187
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss2/3
Vol. 1969: 1871 FEDERAL CONTROLS FOR AUDITORS
the wilful making of any untrue statement of material fact or the wilful
omission to state any material fact required or necessary to be stated
to make such statement not misleading. The prohibited statement or
omission must be made in connection with a registration statement
filed with the Commission pursuant to Section 5 of the Act.160 Because
of this requirement, the prohibitions of Section 24 are somewhat
narrower than the false statement statute 6 ' but the same sort of
questions about material, misleading and the meaning of "wilful"
arise. Much, then, of what was discussed in the treatment of the false
statements statute is relevant here.
So far as the substantive elements are concerned, it need be noted
only that a statement is false within the meaning of Section 24 if no
proper accounting method would produce such a figure. 62 It is material
if it is capable of inducing a purchase of the securities covered by the
statement. ' Actual reliance, then, is not necessary; it is the potential
for deceit that is prohibited.
The second part of Section 24 prohibits the wilful violation of any
of the provisions of the Securities Act or the rules or regulations
promulgated thereunder.' For example, Section 17(a) makes it
unlawful for any person in the offer and sale of securities by the use
of the mails or any means of interstate commerce to employ and
device, scheme or artifice to defraud. 65 It should be noted that Section
17(a) is not limited to false statements contained in a registration
statement as is the false statement provision of Section 24, yet Section
24's penal provisions will apply to the wilful violation of Section 17(a).
Auditors, however, are not normally engaged in the offer and sale
of securities, a prerequisite for the application of Section 17(a) through
Section 24. Presumably, they would incur criminal liability under the
aider and abettor statute if, for example, they fraudulently prepared or
certified a false statement for inclusion in a brochure advertising
securities.'"
The second part of Section 24 also gives the rules and regulations
160 Id
161 IN U SC. 1001 (1964),
162 United States v. Danser, 26 F.R.D. 580, 586 (D. Mass. 1959), affd, 281 F.2d 492 (1st
Cir. 19601)
163 /d
164 IS1L SC , 77x11964).
165 IS U SC. § 77q(a) (1964).
166 ( United States v. Getchell, 282 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1960).
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promulgated under the Act the force and effect of the statute itself.t"'
Pursuant to statutory authority, the Securities Exchange Commission
has promulgated various accounting rules and regulations, most of
which are contained in Regulation S-X.165 This regulation provides that
financial statements are required to be certified exclusively by an
independent public or certified public accountant. 6 While many civil
and disciplinary proceedings have dealt with the auditor's
independence, 70 no criminal cases have been found which specifically
consider accountant violations of this rule.
2. Mens Rea
The best discussions of the "wilfulness" requirement of Section 24
are found in the opinions of the district court and court of appeals in
United States v. Custer Channal Wing Corp.' This was a criminal
contempt case based on a violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act.)
Section 5 requires that certain securities be registered with the
167. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964).
168. 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (1968).
169. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.2-01(b), (c) (1968). The only statements filed with the Commission
under the Securities Act which need not contain certified financial statements are those of issuers
exempt from full registration. Sec. Act Rel. 3600 (1955) and 3783 (1957); CCH FED. SEC. L,
REP., 5889, Regulation E, Schedule A, Item II. While there are more exceptions to the
certification requirement under the Exchange Act, it is still valid to say that most statements filed
with the Commission must be certified. Filings by banks, non-title insurors, and non-North
American foreign issuers need not contain certified statements. See I Loss, 346. Nor need such
statements be included in semi-annual reports filed on Form 9-K, see CCH FED. SEC. L. REP..
31,051, Form 9-K, Instruction C, or in the annual reports of certain registrants not in the
production stage, see CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., T, 31,105, Form 10-K, Instruction as to Financial
Statements, 8(b), or in filings of certain broker-dealers and stock exchange members, see CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP., T, 26,982. Finally, the proxy statement of corporations soliciting proxies for
a merger or some other organic change must contain certified financial statements only if
practicable. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., 91 24,046, Schedule 14A, Item 15(b). These schedules are
summarized in I Loss, 346-47.
170. See. e.g.. In re Sports Areas, Inc., Sec. Act Rel. 4153 (1959) (relationship of auditor's
employee and client); In re A. Hollander & Sons, Inc., 8 S.E.C. 586, 612-17 (1941) (financial
interest in client); In re Interstate Hoisiery Mills, Inc., 4 S.E.C. 706, 717 (1939) (original work
performed by auditor on records he is auditing); In re Metropolitan Personal Loan Co., 2 S.E.C.
803, 813 (1937) (reliance on unverified information); In re American Terminals and Transit Co.,
I S.E.C. 701 (1936) (conscious falsification of facts).
171. 247 F. Supp. 481 (D. Md.), affd. 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 389 U.S. 850
(1967). See also United States v. Danser, 26 F.R.D. 580 (D. Mass. 1959), affd. 281 F.2d 492
(1st Cir. 1960); United States v. Sussman, 37 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1964).
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Securities Exchange Commission before any attempt is made to sell
them to the public. The government had secured an injunction against
the defendant prohibiting violation of this provision. He intentionally
sold securities which were in fact unregistered and was found to have
violated the injunction. He was convicted of contempt.17 3 Contempt, the
district court stated, was like Section 24 of the Securities Act, i.e., it
required a wilful violation.'74 The court reasoned that the injunction
prohibited violation of Section 5 and was therefore equivalent to
Section 24 which would also impose criminal liability for the unlawful
sale of unregistered securities. It was sufficient for a violation of either,
the court held, that the defendant had knowledge of all of the facts
which made the securities subject to the registration requirements.
Actual knowledge that the securities were required to be registered was
unnecessary. 7 5 The court of appeals affirmed,7 6 adopting the same
rationale,' and cited with approval the language of United States v.
Sussman.'7M In Sussman, the court stated that he did:
. . .not now conceive an element of the crime charged. . . to be actual
knowledge that a security was being sold in violation of the law . . . it
was sufficient to establish that the defendants willfully and intentionally
sold or delivered unregistered securities by use of the mails.'7'
As in the discussion of the mens rea requirement of the false statement
statute, it appears that in prosecution for a violation of Section 24
mistake of law, in the sense of not knowing one's actions are
prohibited, is no defense.1'0 In Custer, then, no "evil purpose" needed
to be proven.'5 '
173 United States v. Custer Channal Wing Corp., 247 F. Supp. 481 (D. Md. 1965).
174 Id at 490.
175 Id at 495.
176. 376 t- 2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967).
177 Id at 680-81.
178. 37 F Supp. 294 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
179. Id at 296.
180 This analysis is essentially that of Custer Channal Wing Corp. It is supported by
Sus.mian. and the other cases (which do not deal with the Securities Act) cited therein. However,
it should be noted that the court of appeals also stated that there were findings of fact in the
district court sufficient to support a holding that the defendants did know that they were violating
the law 376 F.2d 675, 682-83 (4th Cir. 1967).
181. It is interesting to note that in United States v. Danser, 26 F.R.D. 580, 586 (D. Md.
1959). the court instructed the jury that the defendant need have an intent to defraud. The
defendant, however, was accused of violating section 17 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q
(1964). and the -intent" to defraud which the court holds necessary is an element of the section.
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However, the court of appeals decision in Custer makes it relatively
clear that one must have knowledge of what one is doing though not
of the prohibition itself.' The court of appeals points 83 out that in
United States v. Crosby,"4 a conviction was overturned because there
was no proof that the defendants "knew or should have known" that
they were underwriters. In United States v. Dardi,8 5 decided by the
same circuit three years later, the court stated that the question was
whether the defendants "knew" that they were selling for a control
group. Knowing or reckless conduct, not with regard to securities law,
but as to those things that are forbidden by the Securities Act, seem
a minimum mens rea under the Custer rationale.'
To apply this to the accountant requires analogy. The question is
whether an auditor who intentionally certifies a financial statement
which is in fact materially false or misleading for inclusion in a
registration statement has acted "wilfully" within the meaning of
Section 24. His certification is a material fact which signifies that an
independent auditor has conducted a professional examination of the
corporation's financial statements. If the accountant were not in fact
independent or had not in fact conducted such an examination, his
representation would be false and within the statute. To this extent the
analogy is valid; but, because financial statements are the
representations of management, if the auditor has performed his
function in accordance with his responsibility and still fails to discover
the falsehoods or learn of the omissions, he should not be subject to
the statute. In this case he would not know that the statements were
false. This knowledge seems required under the Custer rationale.
G. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Section 32(a) is the relevant criminal provision of the Exchange
Act. 87 Its false statements provision differs from its counterpart in the
Securities Act in two ways. First, it is more extensive, encompassing
statements made in any application, report, or document required by
182. 376 F.2d 675, 680 (4th Cir. 1967).
183. Id. at 681.
184. 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961).
185. 330 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1964).
186. This seems even true with regard to the issuance of an injunction. United States v. Custer
Channal Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 680-81 (4th Cir. 1967).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1964).
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the Act or by the rules or regulations promulgated thereunder' 8 while
the analogous provision in Section 24 applies only to registration
statements.' Under section 32(a), an accountant would be exposed to
potential liability in connection with annual or periodic reports' as
well as proxy statements and those submitted in connection with tender
offers.'' Second, it penalizes only the knowing and wilful making of
any statement which is false or misleading with regard to any material
fact and does not, by its terms, apply to wilful omissions of material
facts required to be stated as does Section 24.192 But this seeming
discrepancy in potential liability is of no help to the auditor. His
representation is that in his opinion the statements are fair. They may
be unfair either due to the inclusion of false statements or the omission
of essential information. In either case his representation of their
fairness is false.
Under the Exchange Act as well as the Securities Act, the
Commission's rules and regulations have been given the force and
effect of law.'9" However, the 1934 Act, unlike the 1933 Securities Act,
provides that a defendant may not be subjected to imprisonment for
violating such rules and regulations if he proves his ignorance of their
existence.'
Rule lOb-5 9 5 is the broadest of the regulations under the 1934 Act.
It proscribes the use by any person of the mails or of any means of
interstate commerce, to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, or to make any false statement of material fact or to omit to
state any such fact as is necessary to make the statements which are
made not misleading in connection with the purchase or sale of
188 Lxchange Act k 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1964).
189 15 U S C, § 77x (1964).
190 c, .United States v. Simon, 66 Crim. 831 (S.D.N.Y., June, 1968). appeal docketed, no.
328-30 (2d Cr 1968). But see CCH FED. SEc. L. REP., 31,105, Form 10-K, Instructions
as to Financial Statements, 8.
191, ,ee United States v. Olen, 183 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). But see CCH FED. SEC.
L. Ri P 11 26.871, Schedule 14A, item 15(b).
192 (ompar' Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1964), with Securities Act § 24,
15 U SC § 77x(1964).
193 ,e, -xchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1964). The Commission's rules have
survived attacks on their constitutionality. See e.g.. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp.
808. 831-32 (D Del. 1951) (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968)); Charles Hughes & Co., Inc. v. SEC,
139 1- 2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944) (Exchange Act § 15(c), 15
U.S C , 78o(c)(1) (1964)).
194 Compare Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964) with Exchange Act § 32(a), 15
U S C 78ff(a) (1964).
195 17 C F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1968).
Washington University Open Scholarship
218 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1969: 187
securities.'98 Although application of Rule lOb-5 in a criminal action
has been held valid,'97 it has not been used extensively in such context.,"
It should be noted, however, that Rule lOb-5 relates to practices in
connection with the purchase and sale of securities and is not limited
to those occurring in the offer and sale of securities as in Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act. Accordingly, the accountant may, as a principal,
violate this rule and thus Section 32(a) without resort to the statutory
fiction of the aider and abettor statute. It should also be noted that by
its terms, Rule lOb-5 applies to omissions as well as to commissions.
Thus, though the basic criminal statute, Section 32, does not apply to
omissions, by encompassing the rules set forth in the regulations,
omissions of material fact are made grounds for criminal prosecution.
II. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS
The Securities Exchange Commission is given statutory authority to
establish rules and regulations regarding the privilege of appearance
and practice before it. 199 Rule 2 deals with appearance before the
Commission °° and provides that the Commission may deny such
privilege to any person it finds lacking in character or integrity or who
has engaged in any unethical or improper professional conduct.2",
Under the rules, "practice" includes, but is not limited to, the
accountant's preparation of any statement, opinion or other paper
which is filed with the Commission in any document containing the
accountant's consent. 02 Such consent is required in all documents filed
with a registration statement or report which the accountant has in part
prepared or certified.2 13
If the Commission intends to sanction an accountant, before making
196. Id.
197.'See United States v. Shindler, 173 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
198. A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW, FRAUD 10-12 (1968). The proxy fraud rule, 14a-9, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1968), has also found its way into criminal prosecutions, See United States
v. Pope, 189 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Olen, 183 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). A single false proxy statement can sustain separate counts under both the false statements
provision of section 32(a), and its rules violating provision, see United States v. Pope, 189 F.
Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); III Loss, 1964, because the gravamen of the former is the filing and
of the latter, the solicitation. III Loss, 1994.
199. Exchange Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 78w (1964).
200. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2 (1968).
201. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1968).
202. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(g) (1968).
203. Securities Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964),
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its findings, it affords him notice and an oportunity to be heard.2 14
Upon a final determination that disciplinary action is warranted, the
Commission suspends the offender, notifies the professional societies of
which he is a member and informs the state boards of accountancy of
its actions.1 During the proscribed period, his certificate may not be
included in any document or amendment filed with the Commission
nor may any registration statement containing such certificate become
effective 2m In addition, while he is supended, the accountant may not
utilize the advisory and technical services of the Commission and its
staff. 07 Moreover, there is some doubt as to the efficacy of any
document filed with the Commission subsequent to the suspension
period which contains the accountant's certificate dated during the
proscribed period.208 Finally, in many jurisdictions, such disciplinary
action may constitute adequate grounds for suspension or revocation
of the offender's certificate and license to practice. These sanctions also
affect the auditor's clients who are subject to the Acts' filing and
reporting requirements.2 0' They may as a result be forced to transfer
their business to other accountants.
Most disciplinary hearings are private. 10 The Commission makes
them public only when it deems them to be of sufficient public
interest."' The Commission has said that these proceedings are rare;212
204 Securities Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1964).
205. RAPPAPORT 2 3-9 .
206 Id 22-13
207 Id 24-14.
208. Id
209 S'e RAPPAPORT 22-14.
210 S !- C Acct. Series Rel. No. 81, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 72,103 (1958); see 17
C.F R §§ 203 3,203.5 (1968); RAPPAPORT 23-8.
211 (I S E C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 81, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,103 (1958).
212 Id See RAPPAPORT 23-9. Only 20 of these cases have been made public. In re Weiner,
S.E C Acct Series Rel. No. 110. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,132 (1968); In re Aronowitz,
S.E.C Acct Series Rel. No. 109, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,131 (1967); In re Raftery, S.E.C.
Acct. Series Rel. No 108, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,130 (1967); In re Kerlin, S.E.C. Acct.
Series Rel No. 105, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 4' 72,127 (1966); In re Hurdman, S.E.C. Acct.
Series Rel No. 104, CCH FED. SEC. L REP. r 72,126 (1966); In re Roberts & Morrow, S.E.C.
Aect Series Rel. No. 99. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,121 (1964); In re Stone, S.E.C. Acct.
Series Rel No. 97, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 4' 72,119 (1963); In re Wechsler, S.E.C. Acct. Series
Rel. No. 94, CCH FED SEC. L. REP. f 72,116 (1962); In re Myers, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel.
No. 92, CCH FED SEC. L, REP. 1 72,114 (1962); In re Levison, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No.
91, (CH FED SEC. L. REP. 0 72,113 (1962); In re Swartz, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 88,
CCH I-tD Sic L REP. " 72,110 (1961); In re Bollt & Shapiro, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No.
82, CCH I-ED SEc L. REP. Ir 72,104 (1959); In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, S.E.C. Acct.
Series Rel No 78, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 72,100 (1957); In re Haskin & Sells, S.E.C. Acct.
Washington University Open Scholarship
220 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1969: 187
the actual number is unknown. ":1 Because a finding of "wilfulness" is
not a prerequisite to disciplinary action by the Commission," 4 it may
issue a suspension order even if the accused has acted in good faith and
his integrity is beyond reproach." 5 Nearly all the temporary
suspensions have arisen from negligent audits which resulted in
material misstatements of the relevant financial data."1 6 Lack of
independence 217 and nonadherence to, or lack of knowledge of,
generally accepted accounting principles218 are usually the grounds upon
which these suspensions have been based2 1  but cases involving
substantial improprieties have resulted in more severe sanctions.
A. Permanent Disqualification
Of the twenty disciplinary proceedings made public,21 1 three resulted
in the accountant's permanent suspension from the privilege of
practicing before the Commission.220
It seems obvious that any auditor who would falsely certify that he
had conducted a professional examination when he had not done so
should not remain in practice before the Commission. In one case, the
accountant's certificate stated that he had verified a balance sheet and
its supporting schedules, that they were in agreement with the corporate
records and that, in his opinion, the statements truly reflected the
Series Rel. No. 73, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 72,092 (1952); In re Masquelette & Co., S.E.C.
AcMt. Series Rel. No. 68, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1' 72,087 (1949); it re Barrow, Wade, Guthrie
& Co., S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 67, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 72,086 (1949); In re Williams
& Kingsolver, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 59, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,078 (1947);
Anonymous, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 51, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 4 72,069 (1945); In re
Bryant, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 48, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. i 72,066 (1944); It re Logan,
S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 28, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,046 (1942).
213 RAPPAPORT 23-29.
214. See In re Haskins & Sells, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 73, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
72,092 (1952).
215.. Id.; ef. In re Stone, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 97, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,119
(1963).
216. See. e.g.. In re Haskin & Sells, S.8.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 73, CCH FED. Svc. L. REP.
72.092 (1952); In re F.G. Masquelette & Co., S.E.C. Acet. Series Rel. No. 68, CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 1 72,087 (1949); In re Williams & Kingslover, S.E.C. Acet. Series Rel. No. 59, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,078 (1947).
217. See. e.g.. In re F.G. Masquelette & Co., S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 68, CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 72,087 (1949).
218. See. e.g., In re Haskin & Sells, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 73, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
72,092 (1952).
219, See note 212 supra.
220. In re Levison, S.E.C. Act. Series Rel. No. 91, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,113 (1962);
In re Swartz, S.E.C. Act. Series Rel. No. 88, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 72,110 (1961); it re
Bryant, S.E.C. Act. Series Rel No. 48, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. W 72,066 (1944).
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company's affairs as of the given date.22' The financial statements to
which the certificate related were filed with the Commission as part of
a registration statement and were materially false and misleading in a
number of respects: past due receivables were described as "not yet
due" and substantial payments for services to be performed by the
company in the future were credited to income as received rather than
being accrued. Actually, the accountant had made no audit of the
company's books, had no knowledge of its methods of operation and
was completely unaware of the contents of its "audited" financial
statements. He prepared the certificate without having seen the books
or records, using financial statements prepared by the company's
bookkeeper, a non-public accountant and a former employe of the
defendant. The defendant's unfamiliarity with the rules of the
Commission and the standards of his profession were held to be no
excuse for his conduct and he was found to have engaged in unethical
and unprofessional conduct and was unfit to represent others.
2 12
Nor can an auditor continue to "practice" if he knowingly prepares
a statement which he reasonably should know is false. In In re
Swart:, 2 the accountant provided a corporate officer with ten signed-
in-blank copies of his letterhead stationary. The officer had an
accountant's certificate typed over the signature and attached the paper
to false and fraudulent financial statements which he then circulated.
After the accountant learned of the officer's action, he continued to
work for the client and prepared a pro-forma balance sheet from
figures, which the accountant knew to be fictitious, dictated to him by
the officer. He also prepared, but did not certify, other false and
misleading financial statements for inclusion in an annual report and
a proxy statement to be filed with the Commission. The Commission
found the accountant lacking in the high standard of honesty demanded
of those who practice before it and disqualified him.1
24
The third permanent disqualification involved another accountant
who certified the false statements prepared by Swartz in the preceding
case. 2 5 His audit report contained the standard scope paragraph
221 ,c, In re Bryant, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 48, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 72,066
(1944)
222 Id
223 bi ,, ' wartz S.1 C \cci Series Rel. No. 88. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. C 72,110 (1961).
It also is significant that the auditor had admittedly lied in testifying before the SEC in the early
part ot the nvetigation.
224 it re Ie~ison, S.E.C. Acet. Series Rel. No. 91, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. U 72,113 (1961).
225 In re Ssartz, S.E C. Aect. Series Rel. No. 88, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,110 (1961).
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although the accountant had not conducted an audit and had not seen
the books and records to which his certificate related. Among the
statements which he certified was one he copied from a draft prepared
by a corporate officer (the same officer involved in the Swartz case)
and another which he copied (with material revisions) from a statement
certified by the defendant in Swartz. In suspending the accountant, the
Commission found that he knew the statements would be filed with it
and that he had engaged in unprofessional conduct."2
In each of these cases, criminal intent to defraud could, if needed,
be imputed through recklessness; for purposes of the securities laws the
accountants knew what they were doing and that they were making
false factual representations. In the first case, prosecution on false
statements or mail fraud grounds would also have been possible; in the
second, mail fraud and conspiracy and conceivably aiding and abetting
in the submission of false statements; and in the third case, prosecution
on any of these grounds would appear to have been appropriate.
B. Indefinite Suspension
Two disciplinary proceedings have resulted in suspension of an
accountant's privilege to practice before the Commission until such
time as the Commission itself should determine otherwise."' In In re
Myers,228 an accountant prepared a balance sheet showing a net worth
in excess of $800,000 from information he received over the telephone
from a corporate officer and former client of his firm. He then wrote
a cover letter on his firm's stationary in which he represented that he
had reviewed the company's books and records and had prepared the
balance sheet after such examination. In fact, the accountant had never
seen any of the corporation's books and records and his sole source of
information for the statement was the telephone call. The balance sheet
was false and fraudulent and was used by the company to acquire a
$100,000 bank loan and to secure a favorable credit rating. The
accountant was found guilty of unethical and unprofessional conduct
and suspended from practice before the Commission for a potentially
indefinite period. 29 Although the conduct in this case was analogous
226. Inre Levison, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No.91, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. l 72,113 (1961).
227. it re Myers, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 92, CCH FED. Shc. L. Ri:P. 4 72,114 (1962);
In re Bollt & Shapiro, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 82, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 72,104 (1959).
228. In re Myers, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 92, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 72,114 (1962).
229. Id. Somewhat less than three years later, the Commission ordered that Myer's privilege
of practicing before it be reinstated. In re Myers, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 101, CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 72,123 (1965).
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to that in the previous subsection, it is easily distinguishable in that
nothing which the defendant prepared was submitted to or acted upon
by the Commission or its staff. This distinction may have been the
basis for the lesser penalty imposed here, as evidenced by the treatment
given the accountant in the In re Bollt & Shapiro case.
In In re Bollt & Shapiro,"3 the senior partner of an accounting firm
was also principle promoter, officer, director and stockholder of a
corporation whose financial statements he caused his partner to certify
for inclusion in a registration statement. Bollt signed the registration
statement as a principle officer and director but did not disclose his
relationship to the certifying accountant as required by Form S-1.2 11
Under "company management," he disclosed in detail his activities
and associations but, in stating that he was engaged in active practice
as a certified public accountant, did not reveal the name of his firm.
The accountant's certificate was written on blank paper because the
corporation's address was identical to that of the partnership. The
corporate attorney, without Shapiro's knowledge, typed in the latter's
home address. The Commission found that Bollt had intended to
deceive it and indefinitely suspended him and the firm from practicing
before it. 32 The certifying accountant was held not to have intended to
deceive the Commission 2 3 but because he knew that he was certifying
for inclusion in a registration statement under circumstances in which
he was not independent, he was suspended for thirty days.134
Bollt's suspension was less than would have been anticipated since
he disclosed a character inconsistent with that of the public accounting
profession and had violated its rules of ethics and professional
conduct 35 The only apparent reason for the Commission's leniency
was that it acted before third parties had been injured. However, the
Commission may have indirectly achieved the same result as it would
230. In re Bollt & Shapiro. S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 82, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 72,104
(1959)
231 Form S-1, Part II, Item 24 and instruction, 17 C.F.R. 239.11 (1968).
232 In re Bollt & Shapiro, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 82, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. r 72,104
(1959). Bollt and the firm were indefinitely suspended, but after two years Bollt was ordered
reinstated In re Bollt & Shapiro, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 87, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
72,109 (1961)
233 In re Bollt & Shapiro, S.E C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 82, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. r 72,104
(1959)
234 Id
235. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, Rule I 0 (rev. 1964).
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have with a more severe decision. Under the circumstances, the state
regulatory agency might order a permanent revocation of the
defendant's certificate and license to practice2 36 which would preclude
his future reinstatement before the Commission.23
C. Voluntary Resignation From Practice
There have been seven cases in which the accountant has voluntarily
resigned from practice before the Commission."' All but one of these
cases have occurred since 1962, possibly indicating a new enforcement
policy of the Commission. Voluntary resignation is significant because
it does not constitute an admission of any charges brought against the
accountant.3 9 Because he has not been officially suspended by the
Commission, the defendant may not have his certificate revoked or
suspended by his state board of accountancy.2 10 However, a voluntary
resignation from practice before this federal agency might cause
independent investigation by the state agency into the facts underlying
the accountant's resignation.
In such cases, the Commission apparently feels no need for a hearing
and the accompanying expense. 241 Since only two of the seven
resignation cases have disclosed the facts uncovered by the
236. The state of Bollt's certification was Maryland. See In re Bollt & Shapiro, S.E.C. Acct,
Series Rel. No. 82, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,104 (1959). In Maryland, the cancellation or
suspension of an auditor's privilege to practice before any state or federal agency is a statutory
ground for suspension or revocation of his certificate. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75A. § I I (a)(4)
(1957).
237. The Commission will not recognize a person as a Certified Public Accountant if he is not
registered as such and in good standing under the laws of the place of his residence or principal
office, or as a public accountant a person who is not in good standing and entitled to practice
under the laws of his residence or principal office. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(a) (1968).
See also National Elec. Signal Co., 8 S.E.C. 160, 166 (1940). The foregoing are, of course, the
only types of accountants who are permitted to practice before the Commission. See Regulation
S-X, 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01 (a) (1968).
238. In re Weiner, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 110, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 9 72,132 (1968);
In re Aronowitz, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 109, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,131 (1967); In
re Raftery, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 108, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ' 72,130 (1967); In re
Kerlin, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 105, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 9 72,127 (1966); In re
Hurdman, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 104, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,126 (1966); In re
Wechsler, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 94, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. , 72,116 (1962);
Anonymous, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 51, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T, 72,069 (1945),
239. In re Kerlin, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 105, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,127 (1966).
But see Anonymous, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 51, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 72,069 (1945).
240. See, e.g. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5100(h) (1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 75A, § I I(a);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 326.130(6) (1966).
241. See In re Kerlin S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 105, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP, 72,127
(1966).
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Commission's investigation, 24 2 and there often is no formal finding,243
this alternative may have been made available as a means of inducing
the accused to save whatever face he can while at the same time
protecting the public interest.
In one case,24" ' the accountant's client was a corporate broker-dealer.
The audit report represented that the accountant had reviewed its
accounting records and procedures, analyzed and verified all its
accounts containing debit or credit balances, and examined and verified
all securities and cash items underlying the accounts of its customers,
brokers, and officers, as well as its inventory and trading accounts in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards applicable to
brokers.
The accountant admitted being familiar with a Commission rule
establishing minimum audit procedures for engagements involving
broker-dealers," but he did not observe it. He failed to: (I) verify
securities in transit; (2) investigate the ownership of hypothecated
securities; (3) analyze customers accounts; (4) evaluate the system of
internal accounting and asset controls; and (5) confirm directly bank
balances and loans payable to banks, as well as to make inquiry of
banks as to existing liabilities unrecorded by his client. Apparently, he
issued a favorable report-because the Commission emphasized that in
reality, all was not well with the company.28 It was insolvent; its
customers' securities had been wrongfully used to collateralize its bank
loans or the debts of its officer to the company; and, certain of its notes
payable and the applicable collateral had not been recorded either as
liabilities or as hypothecated assets.
The accountant admitted these facts but the Commission, feeling
that his substandard audit had in no way contributed either to the
frauds perpetrated by his client or in losses to his client's customers,24 7
242 ( ,,pare iJl and Anonymous, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 51, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
4 72.069 11945). nuth In rc Weiner, S.E.C Acct. Series Rel. No. 108, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
€ 72,132 (1968), In re, Aronowitz, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 109, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
72,131 11967), In re' Raftery, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 108, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,130
(1967): In re Hurdman, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 104, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. r 72,126
(1966), In re Wechsler, S E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 94, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 4 72,116 (1962).
243 Se In re Kerlin, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 105, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 72,127
(1966)
244 Anonymous, S.E C Acect. Series Rel. No. 51, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. " 72,069 (1945).
245 \xchange Act Rule 17a(5), 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a(5) (1968).
246 AnonNmous, S E C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 51, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 72,069 (1945).
247 Id
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disclosed these facts with the auditor's consent but interestingly refused
to disclose the defendant's identity. It did disclose that he was a tax
practitioner of some thirty years experience and that this was only his
third SEC engagement. Though the audit was quiet substandard, the
Commission apparently found no conscious improprieties on the
auditor's part and its disposition of the matter, i.e., accepting his
voluntary permanent resignation from practice before it and disclosing
the facts but not his name, served to protect the interests both of the
public investors in securities and the accountant's tax practice.
In re Homer E. Kerlin 4 the other case in which the facts have been
disclosed, is significant for many reasons. First, the accountant, his
partner and employee of their firm, were charged with conspiracy to
violate Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.21 Second, had he not chosen
to resign voluntarily, it is almost certain that Kerlin would have been
permanently disqualified from Commission practice. Third, it indicates
that although it makes no "formal" final determination in the matter,
whenever the Commission wishes to insure complete professional
censure of the accountant, it will publish his name as well as the facts
disclosed by its investigation.
Kerlin's firm certified financial statements for inclusion in an annual
10-K Report filed with the Commission and in a proxy statement
required by Section 14 of the Exchange Act.25 0 The "audited"
company's credit arrangements required that it maintain a current
ratio of at least 2 to I and a net working capital of at least $2.5
million. For years, its bookkeeper had juggled the books in an effort
to meet these prescribed minima and later to surpass them in order to
facilitate the public sale of the company's securities and to induce
another company to merge with it.25t Among other things, the
248. In re Kerlin, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 105, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,127 (1966).
249. See United States v. Olen, 183 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (motion for change of venue
granted). In a related civil litigation under Rule 10b(5), the accountants were charged with
knowingly conspiring with their client to induce the plaintiff company to enter into a merger with
it. H. L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (motion to dismiss denied),
Subsequent to the institution of the Commission's investigation of Kerlin and Childree, the
latter died. In re Kerlin, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 105, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP, 72,127
(1966). In accepting Kerlin's resignation, the Commission considered that fact together with the
fact that the firm had been dissolved, and Kerlin's apparent agreement to withdraw from the
practice of public accounting altogether, and concluded that it would not be inconsistant with the
public interest to permit him to do so.
250. In re Kerlin, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 105, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP, 72,127 (1966).
251. Id. See also H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (Rule 10b(5)
proceeding by the acquiring company).
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bookkeeper failed to record invoices covering large quantities of
merchandise during the accounting periods in which the related
merchandise was received, manipulated and falsified retail inventory
records, and charged numerous capital items to expense in order to
reduce corporate taxable income. The net effect of these improprieties
was an overstatement of net working capital of $4.7 million, an
understatement in vouchers payable of $2.7 million, a shortage in
inventory of $2.8 million, and an understatement in fixed assets of
$800,000. The Commission's investigatory staff felt that these practices
were so slipshod and grossly improper that any professional
investigation by a competent, independent public accountant would
have disclosed them, a disclosure not revealed by the defendant's
audit 252
For example, in order to understate purchase and liabilities, no entry
was made in the voucher register for merchandise as it was received;
thus, there was constantly merchandise on hand with its purchase
liability unrecorded. Generally accepted auditing procedure requires
circularization of all major suppliers, even those to whom no current
balance owing is disclosed on the books.253 If that procedure had been
followed in this case, the liabilities would have been disclosed to the
auditors. In addition, the inventory receipts and their related invoices
were month-keyed by voucher number so that any investigation of the
voucher register would have disclosed payment of the previously
unrecorded liabilities for merchandise purchased in prior months. The
defendant, nevertheless, discovered and/or disclosed none of the
improprieties. Moreover, during one inventory count, the quantity
"400" was materially altered to read "14,400" thereby also increasing
the inventory value by $1.5 million. Even though he had worked on the
company's audit as a staff member, a supervisor, and a partner, the
defendant noted no discrepancy and applied no additional auditing
procedures to determine if any material variation existed. In fact, he
increased the inventory value by an additional $600,000 so that it
would agree with that contained on the company's balance sheet. 54
There could be no doubt as to the defendant's awareness of the true
state of affairs regarding his client because one of his employees had
252 In re Kerlin. S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 105, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,127 (1966).
253 STAT MENT 33, at 38.
254. See In re Kerlin, S.E.C. Acct. Series Rel. No. 105, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 72,127
(1966)
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discovered more than one of the discrepancies and had so informed his
employer."' 5
The Commission's investigatory staff concluded that the defendant's
conduct represented a complete abdication of the responsibilities of an
independent public accountant.2 6 The ultimate determination of his
criminal prosecution is not known but it appears that he was acquitted.
Had he been convicted of a felony, his state board of accountancy
would have revoked his certificate and license to practice .2 1 No longer
being a licensed certified public accountant, he would not be qualified
to practice before the Commission and the disciplinary proceeding
would be superfluous .2  This conclusion is further supported by the fact
that neither of the accountants in United States v. White 29 and United
States v. Benjamin260 were subject to publicly disclosed disciplinary
proceedings. While this does not foreclose the possibility of there
having been such hearings, the facts in both cases were significant
enough to have warranted public disclosure.
CONCLUSION
To be convicted under any of the federal criminal statutes dis-
cussed, an accountant must act either wilfully or intentionally. In in-
terpreting these requirements the courts have sustained convictions
in which the defendant's means re a ranged from negligence to premedi-
tation. The different interpretations depend on both the statute being
construed and the particular court construing it. Thus, the imprecise
guidelines of Congress are further blurred by the courts' inability or
unwillingness to clearly articulate their statutory interpretations. As
United States v. Simon demonstrates, it is no longer sufficient for the
accountant to rely on a reasonable interpretation of standard auditing
rules to resolve difficult questions within the gray areas of accounting.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Kerlin's firm was licensed in Alabama. Id. Although the Alabama accountancy statute
does not explicitly state that a Felony conviction is grounds for suspension or revocation of a
certificate, ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 6(21)(a) (Supp. 1967), nevertheless, a conviction of conspiracy
to violate the anti-fraud provision would undoubtedly be indicative of unprofessional conduct or
constitute "other sufficient cause." Id.
258. See supra note 264; Rule 2-01(a), 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(a) (1968). But if he had not been
suspended by the state, a disciplinary proceeding under Rule 2(e) would have been necessary to
determine whether he had engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct or was otherwise
lacking in character or integrity. See Rule 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 210.2(e)(2) (1968).
259. 124 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1941).
260. 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
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If he must rely on the case-by-case sort of analysis followed by the
courts, there simply are no specific guidelines which tell the accountant
how much he must know to incur liability for an action or how much he
must find out to be held harmless for an omission.
The administrative proceedings before the SEC suffer from the same
sort of inadequacies. Only those actions which are of "public interest"
are reported, and these involve gross violations of the accountants' own
standards. However, even in these circumstances, there are no clear
guidelines which tell an accountant or his attorney what sanction would
be appropriate for particular activities. This ad hoc method of deter-
mining sanctions, while equitable to the individuals involved, offers no
guidelines for the accountant called upon to justify his actions. It is
even unclear whether the level of proof or justification changes with the
seriousness of the sanction being considered.
There should be a consistent standard applied to accountants involved
in securities work. To achieve this consistency, the courts could try to
rationalize the statutes or explain their differences. Alternatively, the
accounting profession could promulgate standards that would be strict
enough to meet the most restrictive criteria found in the decisions.
Neither solution seems feasible or likely. A third alternative, at least
in the securities context, might be an expansion of the SEC regulations,
given the force of law under both the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934
Exchange Act. As the controversy over the lower court decision in
United States v. Simon illustrates, some solution is called for so that
the accountant can at least understand the nature of the obligation
society has chosen to impose on him.
ADDENDUM
As this edition was going to press, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the convictions in United States v. Simon.
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